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Abstract- Geocasting in vehicular communication has witnessed 
significant attention due to the benefits of location oriented 
information dissemination in vehicular traffic environments. 
Various measures have been applied to enhance geocasting 
performance including dynamic relay area selection, junction 
nodes incorporation, caching integration, and geospatial 
distribution of nodes. However, the literature lacks towards 
geocasting under malicious relay vehicles leading to cybersecurity 
concern in vehicular traffic environments.  In this context, this 
paper presents Cybersecurity Measures for Geocasting in 
Vehicular traffic environments (CMGV) focusing on security 
oriented vehicular connectivity. Specifically, a vehicular intrusion 
prevention technique is developed to measure the connectivity 
between the cache agent and cache user vehicles. The connectivity 
between static transport vehicles and cache agent/cache user is 
measured via vehicular intrusion detection approach. The 
performance of the proposed vehicular cybersecurity measure is 
evaluated in realistic traffic environments.  The comparative 
performance evaluation attests the benefits of security oriented 
geocasting in vehicular traffic environments. 




OCATION oriented decision making in driverless cars is 
one of the finest examples of the significance of location 
oriented communication in vehicular cyber physical systems 
environments (see Fig. 1) [1, 2, 3]. The location-oriented 
services in vehicular environments is continuously growing 
staring from navigation to real time traffic prediction. It 
includes smart use cases of intelligent transport system such as 
safety and efficiency oriented cooperative vehicular 
communication, and sensor oriented emergency response for 
driver assistance [4, 5]. Recently, location oriented vehicular 
communication also known as geocasting has witnessed 
significant attention considering its applicability in the wide 
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Location oriented vehicular communication has been 
extensively explored for performance improvements focusing 
on vehicle mobility management. A geocasting technique has 
been presented focusing on locality centric regular vehicles as 
information caching points during opportunistic transmissions 
[7]. It has developed a dynamic transmission range adaptation 
enabled caching technique for addressing intermittent 
connectivity in urban vehicular traffic environments. However, 
the caching centric geocasting is far from addressing malicious 
caching vehicles in traffic environments. The segment vehicle, 
link quality, and degree of connectivity oriented performance 
improvement in geographic information dissemination has been 
suggested for vehicular traffic environments [8]. The relay 
vehicles have been selected within the dynamic segment area of 
the transmission range. The selection has been aided using the 
information about quality of link, and degree of connectivity, 
with the corresponding next cell of transmission for each 
vehicle within segment area. However, the segment vehicle 
oriented performance improvement lacks malicious segment 
vehicles consideration. A mobility immune geographic 
information dissemination technique has been suggested 
suitable for opportunistic vehicular networks [9]. It has 
identified information dissemination trajectory from source to 
destination focusing on mobility immune characteristic of the 
trajectory. It has utilized a multi-queueing system for 
prioritizing data transmission during opportunistic node 
encounters. The mobility immune geographic information 
dissemination also lacks considering malicious mobile nodes 
environments and its security oriented implications.  
  
The cybersecurity on location centric information 
dissemination lacks volume in literature under vehicular traffic 
environments. Location centric malicious vehicle detection has 
been investigated considering single and multiple location 
(path) forging of vehicles as case studies [10]. The malicious 
vehicles detection strategy is based on the transmission range 
and speed variance monitoring via roadside units infrastructure. 
The deployment constraints of roadside infrastructure reduces 
the feasibility considering financial and planning aspects. To 
overcome the infrastructure constraint, directional antenna 
based location verification system has been suggested without 
depending on roadside units [11]. The multiple directional 
antennas have been utilized for preprocessing received signal 
strength values of the location claim of vehicles. The claim has 
been further verified using a static wireless location verification 
system. The number of directional antenna requirement reduces 
the applicability and generalization of the technique.  Towards 
reducing the directional antenna constraint, a location 
verification oriented security framework has been suggested for 




security filter has been presented for detecting malicious 
vehicle focusing on link quality in initial level, and statistical 
accumulation of neighbor belief in second level. However, the 
aforementioned location verification oriented vehicular 
security approaches are more suitable for non-critical traffic 
applications, rather than location oriented information 
dissemination or geocasting. More provable security approach 
than verification is the need of the hour for location centric 
information dissemination in vehicular traffic environments.  
Towards this end, this paper presents a framework for 
Cybersecurity Measures for Geocasting in Vehicular traffic 
environments (CMGV) focusing on security oriented vehicular 
connectivity. It consists of vehicular intrusion prevention and, 
detection techniques against cyberattacks in connected vehicle 
environments. The vehicular cybersecurity framework is 
implemented for location oriented information dissemination or 
geocasting to test its resistive performance against malicious 
vehicles. The key contributions of the paper can be summarized 
as follows: 
1) Firstly, a system model for the vehicular cybersecurity 
connectivity is presented focusing on expectation of the 
presence of the nearest security authenticator and the 
probability of connectivity. 
2) Secondly, a vehicular intrusion prevention (VIP) technique 
is proposed using two-way authentication at network 
initialization stage namely, cache-user side authentication 
and cache-agent side authentication.    
3) Thirdly, a vehicular intrusion detection technique is 
developed focusing on next hop verification using 
unauthorized node detection and compromised node 
detection. 
4) Finally, the proposed vehicular security framework CMGV 
is tested to comparatively evaluate the performance with 
state-of-the-art techniques focusing on network 
performance and security related metrics under vehicular 
traffic environments. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
reviews the recent unsecure and security oriented geocasting 
techniques for vehicular networks. Section III presents the 
detail of the proposed vehicular cybersecurity measures for 
geocasting in vehicular traffic environments. Section IV 
discusses simulation setting and analysis of results. Section V 
presents conclusion and future direction of the work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In this section, related literature on data propagation in 
VANETs has been reviewed focusing on unsecured geocasting 
and security-based geocasting. 
A. Unsecured Geocasting 
Caching and transmission range control (CTRC) based 
geocast routing utilizes two forwarding schemes: line 
forwarding for hop- to- hop data delivery and area forwarding 
for hop-to-multi hop data delivery [13]. Range forwarding 
reduces the transmission range. For that reason the effect of 
dynamic mobility patterns and speed of vehicular nodes on data 
delivery ratio is greatly reduced. It also increases hop count 
drastically. The metrics: segment vehicle, link quality and 
degree of connectivity have been utilized to select next hop 
vehicle in vehicular adhoc networks [8]. Although it reduces 
one hop disconnection, yet increases hop count. . However, the 
segment vehicle oriented performance improvement lacks 
malicious segment vehicles consideration. Guaranteed geocast 
routing has been suggested to provide reliable packet 
forwarding based on caching and heuristic function in 
intermittently connected vehicular environment [7]. It 
minimizes the hop to hop disconnection, hop count and end to 
end delay in non-malicious environment while lacking 
performance in malicious environment. Multi-metric 
geographical routing has been proposed to select next hop 
vehicle from dynamic forwarding region while considering 
future position of vehicle, received signal strength and critical 
area vehicles as forwarding metrics [14]. It reduces end to end 
delay, hop count and probability of link failure while 
maintaining quality of connectivity. In case of integration with 
traffic light and real time traffic status, performance is 
degraded.  
Cache agent based geocast (CAG) routing has been 
suggested while categorizing vehicles as cache agent (CA) and 
cache user (CU) [15]. When a CU leaves its old locality and 
enters into a new locality, the incumbent CA sends its presence 
information. Connectivity assurance algorithm (CAA) is 
utilized to assure successful delivery of cached data. Despite of 
transmitting data packets with full radio range, probability of 
connectivity drastically reduces in case of attack by intruders. 
The static cache used in CAA, causes resource wastage. The 
issue of reachability is also a big concern. It only retransmits 
when cached data is not successfully delivered to the notified 
target node. A mobility immune geographic information 
dissemination technique has been suggested suitable for 
opportunistic vehicular networks [9]. It has identified 
information dissemination trajectory from source to destination 
focusing on mobility immune characteristic of the trajectory. It 
has utilized a multi-queueing system for prioritizing data 
transmission during opportunistic node encounters. The 
mobility immune geographic information dissemination also 
lacks considering malicious mobile nodes environments and its 
security oriented implications. The channel selection 
framework based on fuzzy has been suggested for location 
oriented services in multichannel vehicular cyber physical 
system [16]. Channel access delay which is derived using 
Markov chain model, and signal to interference ratio are 
utilized to estimate channel quality. It minimizes the problem 
of traffic imbalance and end to end delay and enhances 
throughput. Still, this approach does not incorporate dynamic 
node mobility patterns. For that reason, its efficiency is not 
accurately gauged in VANETs. Connectivity-aware routing 
(CAR) has been explored while utilizing path segments with 
higher probability of connectivity [17]. The probability of 
connectivity is derived from probabilistic model of network 
disconnection and uses statistical traffic information. In case of 
inaccurate road density calculation, estimation of optimized 
path selection can be inaccurate.  
B. Security Oriented Geocasting 
Location centric malicious vehicle detection has been 
investigated considering single and multiple location (path) 
forging of vehicles as case studies [10]. The malicious vehicles 
detection strategy is based on the transmission range and speed 
 
 
variance monitoring via roadside units infrastructure. The 
deployment constraints of roadside infrastructure reduces the 
feasibility considering financial and planning aspects. To 
overcome the infrastructure constraint, directional antenna 
based location verification system has been suggested without 
depending on roadside units [11]. The multiple directional 
antennas have been utilized for preprocessing received signal 
strength values of the location claim of vehicles. The claim has 
been further verified using a static wireless location verification 
system. The number of directional antenna requirement reduces 
the applicability and generalization of the technique. Towards 
reducing the directional antenna constraint, a location 
verification oriented security framework has been suggested for 
geographic information dissemination [12]. The two levels of 
security filter has been presented for detecting malicious 
vehicle focusing on link quality in initial level, and statistical 
accumulation of neighbor belief in second level.  
Location error resilient geographical routing has been 
suggested to assess error in the neighboring vehicle’s location 
while utilizing error estimation technique based on Rayleigh 
distribution [18]. The neighboring vehicle’s location is 
predicted using location prediction and correction technique 
based on Kalman filter. The route reporting scheme while 
preserving privacy has been proposed for both self-organizing 
and infrastructure based traffic management systems [19]. In 
this scheme, two variants of route sharing: elliptical curve 
cryptography point addition based route sharing scheme and 
homomorhic encryption based route sharing scheme have been 
suggested for self-organizing vehicular ad hoc network. An 
information theoretic framework for location verification has 
been developed while minimizing mutual information between 
input and output data of system [20]. In this framework, input 
data is taken as user’s claimed location and base station 
received signal strength, while forming optimal decision rules. 
Non line of sight location verification scheme has been 
suggested among cooperative neighboring vehicles while 
securing integrity for localization services in vehicular 
environment [21]. The false location advertising malicious 
vehicle detection has been investigated using proactive 
cooperative neighbor location verification scheme [22]. It 
avoids malicious vehicle to forward critical information by 
utilizing two warning dissemination techniques in vehicular 
environment.  
In [23, 24], Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) model based on 
asymmetric cryptography has been proposed to protect 
VANETs from outside attacks. But, it is unable to detect the 
inside attacks. A novel model, simpler and cheaper than PKI 
based system utilizes two techniques for data dissemination: 
directional data verification and time based data verification 
[25]. The critical data has been disseminated through two 
channels and information received from both channels has been 
verified by the recipient vehicles to check integrity. 
III. VEHICLE CYBERSECURITY MEASURES FOR GEOCASTING 
In this section, the proposed Cybersecurity Measures for 
Geocasting in Vehicular traffic environments (CMGV) is 
presented in detail. It consists of system model for connectivity 
oriented vehicular cybersecurity, vehicular intrusion 
prevention, and vehicular intrusion detection.  
Table I. Notations 
Notation Description Notation Description 
R1  Transmission range of CA xln   Longitude 









 𝑓𝑟(𝑟) Probability density function pu  Public key 
𝐸(𝑟) Expected distance  pv  Private key 
𝑃CA 
𝑐  Probability of connectivity of CA g  Very large prime number 
𝑃SV 
𝑐  Probability of connectivity of SV rv Verification component 
𝑉𝑛 Number of vehicles mv Validation component 
𝜆 Density of vehicles x GPS location of vehicle 
 
A. System Model-Vehicular Cybersecurity Connectivity 
A realistic vehicular traffic environment is considered for 
connectivity oriented vehicular cyber security measurements.  
The vehicular infrastructure is based on cache agent1 (CA), 
cache user2 (CU) and static vehicular infrastructure3 (SV) 
consideration. Vehicles of particular locality or junction having 
some predefined source and destination are considered as CA, 
while other vehicles not belonging to this category are 
considered as CU. Roadside transmission unit and other 
infrastructure are considered as SV. The cache agent vehicles 
execute distributed authentication and provide local caching 
support in case of disconnected vehicular network 
environments. The cache user vehicles executes cooperative 
location oriented information dissemination or geocasting. The 
cache users eliminates malicious vehicles while geocasting via 
vehicular intrusion prevention and detection. The static 
vehicular infrastructure executes alternative security 
verification for cache user and cache agent vehicles in case of 
network load oriented delay in vehicular security verification.  
A vehicle vi execute the cybersecurity framework on either 
nearest CA or SV. Here, the distance between the nearest CA 
or SV and vi is quite significant and must be less than R for 




of the presence of a nearest CA or SV is a 









    





]  (1) 
Where 𝑃<𝑟 
0 represents the probability of no CA or SV at a 
distance smaller than 𝑟 < 𝑅, 𝑃
𝑟|(𝑟+∆𝑟) 
𝑠𝐶𝐴/𝑆𝑉
denotes the probability of 
some CA or SV between the distances 𝑟  and (𝑟 + ∆𝑟) , and 
𝑃<𝑟 
𝑠𝐶𝐴/𝑆𝑉
represents the probability of some CA or SV at a 
distance smaller than 𝑟 . Towards directional authenticator 
searching, front half of the transmission range is considered in 
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… ]            (2) 
Where 𝑉𝑛  represents the number of vehicles in network area, 
and 𝜆 is the density of vehicles. By applying limit theorem in 
Eq. (2), the probability density function 𝑓𝑟(𝑟) of the distance of 








= 𝑉𝑛𝜆𝜋𝑟(1 − 𝜆𝜋𝑟
2)𝑉𝑛  (3) 
By utilizing Eq. (3) with restricted network area  𝑉𝐴 , the 
expected distance of the nearest CA or SV can be derived as 
expressed in Eq. (4).   
 
 𝐸(𝑟) = ∫ 𝑟𝑓𝑟(𝑟)𝑑𝑟
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𝑖   (4) 
The constraint 𝐸(𝑟) < 𝑅  related to the expected distance 
𝐸(𝑟)  and transmission 𝑅  is significant for the successful 
execution of the vehicular cybersecurity framework. Once the 
aforementioned constraints satisfies, the connectivity between 
the target vehicles with either CA or SV is another major 
service monitoring parameter. Towards verifying the 
probability of connectivity, let us consider the arrival rate of 
vehicular nodes on road follows Poisson process and the inter-
arrival time is exponentially distributed with parameter ρ. It is 
also assumed that there are 𝑁  discrete levels of speed of 
vehicles in the network, i.e. s1, s2, s3 … sN . The probability 
𝑃CA 
𝑐 of connectivity with CA can be expressed as given by Eq. 
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Where 𝑃𝑟|(𝑟+∆𝑟) 
𝑛𝐶𝑈  is the probability of the presence of a CU 
which is further connected to CA or SV in the next hop 
transmission. Similarly the probability 𝑃SV 
𝑐 of connectivity with 











  (6) 
By utilizing Eq. (5) and (6), the probability 𝑃CA/SV 
𝑐  of 
successful execution of the security framework can be 
calculated as normalized probability.  
B. Vehicular Security Measures 
1) Vehicular Intrusion Prevention 
In the vehicular intrusion prevention (VIP), authentication 
is performed at both cache user, cache agent sides. The 
authentication ensure security oriented connectivity between 
cache agent and cache user in one and multi hops 
communications.  The transmission range of cache users and 
cache agents are managed dynamically towards reducing error 
insertion and further propagation. It is developed as two 
authentication process namely, cache user side and cache agent 
side authentication.    
CU (Intruder)CA
Fig. 1. Vehicular Intrusion Prevention 
Algorithm 1:  Vehicular Intrusion Prevention  
   Input: xlt, xln, ts, m;  
   Process:   
1. Extract xlt, xln, and time stamp ts  attached with a cache user. 
2. Cache User side Autentication (xlt, xln, ts, m) 
The cache user generates the public key  pu, and the private key pv. 
3. Broadcasts the key pu to neighboring vehicles. 
4. Generates a large prime number g 
5. Calculate k = xlt
xln and r = gpuk ln k 
6.        Encrypts the message 𝑚 using the Eq. (7) into the message m3. 
7. Calculates s = pu × k × ln(m3 × k)  
8. Transmit  (m3, s) message to the intended cache agent inside the 
cache user’s cluster. 
9. end Cache User side Autentication () 
10. Cache Agent side Authentication (pu, (m3, s)) 
11. The cache agent generates a private key 𝑝𝑣 = 𝑔
𝑝𝑢. 
12. Calculates verification component rv using Eq.(8) 
13.  if (rv = r) then 
14.      Calculates validation component mv using Eq. (9). 
15.           if (mv = m ) then 
16.              The cache agent validates the message 𝑚 
17.           else message 𝑚 is altered. 
18.           end if 
19.   else Discard 𝑚; 
20.   end if 
21. end Cache Agent side Authentication () 
 
In cache-user side authentication, a cache user carries out 
authentication before disseminating any data packets in the 
network among cache agents. The authentication is performed 
in three phases including setup, key generation and signing.  In 
the setup phase, spatiotemporal data such as latitude xlt , and 
longitude xln  of a GPS location x , and time stamp values 
attached with cache user are extracted and passed it as 
parameters to the next key generation phase. In key generation, 
each cache user generates a public key pu and private key pv. 
Further, the public key is disseminated among the neighboring 
cluster vehicles. In the signing phase, the cache user generates 
a large prime number  g  and calculates k = xlt
xln  and  r =
gpu×k ×ln×k. Here, pu is the public key of the intended cache 
agent of the cluster in which target vehicle belongs. Further to 
this, the hashing oriented triple encryption system is applied 
message 𝑚. The three rounds of encryption execution can be 
expressed as given by Eq. (7). 







  (7) 
 
 
Where E1and E2 represents encryption function and h denotes 
the hashing function. Further, cache user calculates s = pu ×
k × ln(m3 × k) and floods (m3, s) message inside its cluster 
for disseminating the message to the intended cache agent for 
authentication (see fig. 1).  
In cache-agent side authentication operates in two phases 
including verification and integrity tests towards ensuring 
identification of malicious manipulation in received data. The 
intended cache agent generates its public key pu  and private 
key 𝑝𝑣 = 𝑔
𝑝𝑢  in key generation phase of cache-user side 
authentication. The CA initiates verification once it receives 
(m3, s)  message from neighboring vehicles. In verification, 
cache agent calculates verification component rv and compares 





== 𝑟 = 𝑔𝑝𝑢𝑘 𝑙𝑛 𝑘    (8) 
The cache agent moves to integrity phase with the successful 
verification test in Eq.(8).  Towards ensuring malicious 
altercation identification, cache agent calculates validation 
component mv and compares it with m as expressed in Eq. (9). 
  𝑚𝑣 = {
𝐷1(𝑚1, 𝑝𝑣) == 𝑚
𝐷1(𝐷2(𝑚2, 𝑘), 𝑝𝑣) == 𝑚
𝐷1(𝐷2(𝑟ℎ𝑟𝑣(𝑚3), 𝑘), 𝑝𝑣) == 𝑚
  (9) 
Where 𝐷1  and 𝐷2  represents decryption function,  𝑟ℎ  denotes 
reverse of the hashing function considered. The cache agent 
validates the message and moves to further transmission 
towards the intended cache user vehicle. The complete process 
of intrusion prevention is presented as Algorithm 1.  
2) Vehicular Intrusion Detection 
The vehicular intrusion detection (VID) operates towards 
security enhancements in one and two hop communication 
between cache agent or cache user and static vehicular 
infrastructure. Towards identifying malicious error insertion 
and propagation, VID operates in two phases in vehicular 
infrastructure supported communication considering the larger 
transmission range. Firstly, it detects all the unauthorized or 
unauthenticated vehicles in the vehicular network.  Secondly, it 












Fig. 2. Vehicular Intrusion Detection 
Algorithm 2: Vehicular Intrusion Detection 
    Input: x1, x2, x3, x4; 
    Process:   
1. Unauthorized Node Detection (x1, x2, x3, x4) 
2. Authenticate new vehicle by already authenticated neighboring 
vehicles existing in direct communication range. 
3. New vehicle calculates message m1 using Eq. (10)  
4. Neighboring vehicles calculate message m2 using Eq. (11) 
New vehicle calculates message  m3using Eq. (12) 
5. Neighboring vehicles calculate message m4 and m5 using Eq. (13) 
and Eq. (14) 
6. Neighboring vehicles validate new vehicle using Eq. (15) and Eq. 
(16) 
7.    if (m4 == m1&& m5 == m2 ) then 
8.           Authorized vehicle 
9.    else Unauthorized vehicle; 
10.  end if 
11. end Unauthorized Node Detection () 
12. Compromised Node Detection (x1, x2, x3, x4) 
13. New vehicle calculates message m1 using Eq. (17) and transmit to 
neighboring vehicle. 
14. Neighboring vehicles calculate massage m2  using Eq. (18) and 
transmit to new vehicle. 
15. New vehicle calculates message  m3 using Eq. (19) and transmit to 
neighboring vehicles. 
16. Neighboring vehicles calculate message m4 and m5 using Eq. (20) 
and Eq. (21), respectively. 
17. Neighboring vehicles validate new vehicle using Eq. (22) and Eq. 
(23), respectively 
18.     if (m4 == m1&& m5 == m2 ) then 
19.                 Uncompromised vehicle; 
20.     else Compromised vehicle; 
21.   end if 
22. end Compromised Node Detection
The unauthorized node detection operates as the network 
initialization phase for new vehicles both cache user and cache 
agent. It is a cooperative vehicle initialization where the 
neighboring vehicles or vehicular infrastructure is responsible 
for authenticating any new or unknown vehicles in the network. 
Let us consider, a new node X1 joins the network with existing 
already authenticated nodes  𝐴 , 𝐵  and 𝐶 (see Fig. 2). The 
neighboring nodes under direct communication range 
authenticate in joining the network. Considering node 𝐴 out of 
transmission range, the cooperative network initialization of X1 
by the nodes under direct transmission range 𝐵 and 𝐶 can be 
sequentially expressed as given by Eq. (10)-(14).  
 
𝑋1 → 𝐵, 𝐶: 𝑚1 = 𝛽1
−𝑥1𝛽3
𝑥3    (10) 
𝐵, 𝐶 → 𝑋1: 𝑚2 = 𝐻(𝛽1, 𝛽3, 𝑥1, 𝑥3, 𝑚1)  (11) 
 
𝑋1 → 𝐵, 𝐶: 𝑚3 = 𝛼14 − 𝛼5 + 𝑘𝑚2(𝛼9 − 𝛼15) (12) 










   (13) 
𝐵, 𝐶: 𝑚5 = 𝐻(𝛽1, 𝛽3, 𝑥1, 𝑥3, 𝑚4)    (14) 
Where 𝑚𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1 … 5  represents encrypted message using 
encryption parameters 𝛽𝑖  and 𝛼𝑖 . These parameters are 
calculated as shown in Table I, and II (see Appendix). The 
neighboring nodes 𝐵 and 𝐶 authorize network initialization for 
𝑋1 once the following two constraints given by Eq. (15) and 











== 𝑚1   (15) 
𝑚5 = 𝐻(𝛽1, 𝛽3, 𝑥1, 𝑥3, 𝑚4) == 𝑚2     (16) 
 
 
Once the network initialization successfully completes for 𝑋1, 
It can further helps in initialization of other new nodes joining 
the network such as 𝑋2. As an illustration of VID, suppose 𝐴, 
𝐵  and 𝐶  are authenticated nodes, and X1 and X2  are joining 
nodes requesting for network initialization (see fig. 2). 
Considering node X1 is out of transmission range of 𝐴 but 𝐵, 𝐶 
are moving within its transmission range. Similarly, node X2 is 
out of transmission range of 𝐵and 𝐶, but 𝐴 and X1 are moving 
within its transmission range. Firstly, the node X1  joins the 
network initialized by neighbors nodes B, C (node A is out 
of  X1 ’s transmission range). Secondly, node X2 joins the 
network initialized by its neighbors X1  and 𝐴, as 𝐵 and 𝐶 are 
out of transmission range of X2. 
Node N 
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Fig.3. Vehicle Security Architecture of CMGV
The compromised node detection operates while hop-by-
hop data dissemination. It is executed by vehicular 
infrastructure considering its vehicle monitoring capability due 
to the regularity or availability in the traffic environments. The 
detection is based on confidence interval calculation for next 
hop node using chi-square function. Considering X1  as 
candidate next hop, and 𝐴, 𝐵 as authenticated neighbors, the 
detection oriented message communication can be summarized 
as given by Eq. (17)-(21).  
𝑋1 → 𝐵, 𝐶: 𝑚1 = 𝛽1
−𝑥1𝛽3
𝑥3𝑒𝑓(𝑥1,𝑥2)   (17) 
𝐵, 𝐶 → 𝑋1: 𝑚2 = 𝐻(𝛽1, 𝛽3, 𝑥1, 𝑥3, 𝑚1)  (18) 
𝑋1 → 𝐵, 𝐶: 𝑚3 = 𝛼14 − 𝛼5 + 𝑘𝑚2(𝛼9 − 𝛼15) + 𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2) (19)  










   (20) 
𝐵, 𝐶: 𝑚5 = 𝐻(𝛽1, 𝛽3, 𝑥1, 𝑥3, 𝑚4)            (21) 
Where 𝛽𝑖  and 𝛼𝑖  represent encryption parameters and Here, 
𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2) denotes a chi-square distribution function. It is used 
to determine the confidence interval of sender node. Towards 
negating as a compromised node, the function value is 
considered under confidence interval once the constraints given 













𝑥3𝑒𝑓(𝑥1,𝑥2) == 𝑚1      (22) 
𝑚5 = 𝐻(𝛽1, 𝛽3, 𝑥1, 𝑥3, 𝑚4) = 𝐻(𝛽1, 𝛽3, 𝑥1, 𝑥3, 𝑚1) == 𝑚2 (23) 
The next hop evaluation using confidence interval value 
validates a non-compromise node which can be used in  data 
dissemination. The complete steps vehicular intrusion detection 
is presented as algorithm 2. The control flow architecture of 
CMGV framework is also presented in fig.3. It consists of VIP 
and VID techniques against cyber attacks in connected vehicle 
environments. In case of intrusion detection is not possible then, 
a VIP technique is applied using two-way authentication at 
network initialization stage namely, cache-user side 
authentication and cache-agent side authentication. Otherwise, 
a VID technique is applied focusing on next hop verification 
using unauthorized node detection and compromised node 
detection. 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In this section, simulations carried out to evaluate the 
performance of the proposed vehicle cybersecurity framework 
for geocasting is discussed focusing on simulation settings, 




A. Simulation Settings  
The proposed CMGV framework is implemented in a 
vehicular traffic embedded and highly sophisticated ad-hoc 
network communication testbed, named CA-VANSL (Cache 
Agent based Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks Simulation Lab). This 
test bed is established in Communication Networks and 
Simulation Research Lab, School of Computer and Systems 
Sciences (SC&SS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New 
Delhi, India. This testbed has effectively simulated a number of 
our previous research works [15], [16]. CMGV is simulated 
using Network Simulator (ns 2.35). Topologically Integrated 
Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER) database is 
used for street layouts implementation in the proposed protocol 
[26]. The US Census Bureau Department for analyzing 
geospatial attributes of a region utilizes this database. Traffic 
simulator: Simulation for Urban Mobility (SUMO) is used for 
analyzing the distribution of vehicular nodes in different photo-
periods [27].  
VanetMobiSim, an advanced version of CANU mobility 
simulation environment is used for generating realistic mobility 
patterns [28]. The main motive for optimal utilization of 
VanetMobiSim is due to the availability of both macro and 
micro mobility patterns. Intelligent-Driver Model is used for the 
management of node’s movement in urban VANETs [29]. The 
performance of CMGV is compared with the state of the art 
techniques CTRC [13], D-Flooding [30], CAG [15], 
respectively. Table II shows the list of parameters used to 
configure the simulation scenario. The effectiveness of CMGV 
framework is measured using three different types of malicious 
vehicles. The type 1 malicious vehicles are prevented to join the 
network. The type 2 malicious vehicles are able to penetrate the 
secured architecture and are detectable. The type 3 malicious 
vehicles neither prevent to join the network nor detectable. The 
simulation result for every scenario is obtained by averaging 
results of 20 simulation repetitions with different seeds. 
 
Table III. Simulation parameters 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Mobility Model 𝑉𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑚 MAC protocol 802.11 𝐷𝐶𝐹  
Simulation Time 300 𝑠𝑒𝑐 Channel Capacity  4 𝑀𝑏𝑝𝑠 
Map Size 1500 𝑋 1500 𝑚2 Traffic Model 16 𝐶𝐵𝑅  
No .of Lanes 2 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑠/𝑑𝑖𝑟 Traffic light period 50 𝑠𝑒𝑐 
No. of vehicles 500 Beaconing interval 0.75𝑠𝑒𝑐 
Malicious vehicles 50 Packet senders  20 
Velocity 10 − 150𝑘𝑚/ℎr Packet Type 𝑈𝐷𝑃 
Size of Buffer 64 𝐾𝐵 Channel Type 𝑊𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 
Size of Packet 512 𝐵𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 Propagation Model 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 
No. of Intersections 35 Antenna Model 𝑜𝑚𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 
Transmission Range 500𝑚 𝑡𝑜 1000𝑚 Packet Rate 0.1 𝑡𝑜 1 𝑠𝑒𝑐 
B. Analysis of Results 
Two scenarios are considered to measure the impact of fixed 
and varying number of malicious vehicles on connectivity. Fig. 
5 shows the relationship between connectivity probability and 
number of CU, CA and SV (fig. 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c)) 
respectively. As expected, for all the three cases, the 
connectivity probability increases as number of vehicles (CU or 
CA or SV) increase. The connectivity probability at high 
transmission range is higher as compared to the connectivity 
probability at low transmission range.  CA achieves complete 
connectivity with lesser number of vehicles as compared to CU, 
since CA has higher transmission range as compared to CU. 
Similarly, SV has higher transmission range as compared to 
CA/CU, therefore achieves complete connectivity with lower 
number of vehicles. The number of vehicles per segment length 










Fig.4. Connectivity Probability (PC) vs Number of 
CA, CU and SV 
Fig.5 shows the impact of malicious vehicles on the 
connectivity in case of CMGV and state-of-the-art techniques. 
In this simulation, 200 vehicles are considered. It is clearly 
enunciated that connectivity of CMGV steadily decreases as the 
 
 
number of malicious vehicles increases. But connectivity in 
case of CAG, CTRC, and D-Flooding decreases gradually with 
lesser number of malicious vehicles, while decreases rapidly 
with large number of malicious vehicles. More specifically, for 
CMGV, the connectivity probability is in the range of 0.9-1.0, 
whereas it is 0.7-0.9, 0.6-0.2 and 0.4-0.02 in case of CAG, 
CTRC, and D-Flooding, respectively. This can be attributed to 
the fact that, in case of CMGV, VIP identifies the fake-
beaconed position information and resists the intruder to join 
the network. If the malicious attacker is able to penetrate the 
secured architecture and compromises an insider, then VID 
phase is able to detect and block both malicious vehicles.  
 
 
Fig.5. Connectivity Probability (PC) vs Number of Malicious 
Vehicles (𝑁𝑚) 
 
Fig. 6. Packet Delivery Ratio (%) vs Number of CA, CU and 
SV (NV) in presence of 20 malicious vehicles 
Fig.6 shows the packet delivery ratio with different values 
of the number of three types of vehicles  NV . It is clearly 
enunciated that packet delivery ratio of CMGV, and CAG 
steadily increases in commensurate with the increase of number 
of vehicles, while for CTRC, and D-Flooding, it remains 
constant. More specifically, in case of CMGV, packet delivery 
ratio is in the range of 35%-93%, whereas it is 30%-92%, 53% 
and 7% in case of CAG, CTRC, and D-Flooding, respectively. 
This can be attributed to the fact that, in case of CMGV, VIP 
phase identifies the fake beaconed position information and 
resists the intruder to join the network. If the malicious attacker 
is able to penetrate the secured architecture and compromises 
an insider, then VID phase is able to detect and block both 
malicious node and compromised node. CTRC has better 
packet delivery ratio as compared to D-flooding, due to 
utilization of caching methodology in case of unavailability of 
suitable nodes. D-flooding does not use caching technique in 
case of network fragmentation and has lowest packet delivery 
ratio. 
 
Fig. 7: Packet Loss (%) vs. Number of CA, CU and SV (NV) 
in presence of 20 malicious vehicles 
Fig.7 shows the packet loss with different values of number 
of vehicles (NV) . It clearly shows that the packet loss rate 
decreases, when number of vehicles increases in case of CMGV 
and CAG, and remains constant in case of CTRC, and D-
flooding. In case of CMGV, utilization of VIP and VID helps 
in optimization of node selection process and chooses secure 
node as data forwarder. This minimizes the probability of 
packet loss. CAG utilizes CAA algorithm which reduces one 
hop transmission failure rate. The packet loss of CTRC is higher 
than CMGV and CAG, and not affected by the increment of NV 
due to its non-usability of CAA algorithm, and non-
consideration of off-road vehicles for data forwarding. The 
inability of delivering data packets in fragmented vehicular 
networks makes the packet loss highest in case of D- Flooding. 
In particular, for CMGV, packet loss rate is in the range of 20%-
8%, whereas it is 20%-10%, 43% and 94% in case of CAG, 
CTRC and D-Flooding, respectively. 
 
Fig. 8. Network Load (%) vs. Number of CA, CU and 
SV (NV) in presence of 20 malicious vehicles 
 
 
The results in Fig. 8 show the analysis of network load for 
data forwarding as a function of number of vehicles(NV). It 
clearly shows that network load decreases with the increase of 
number of nodes. CMGV never uses flooding mechanism for 
data forwarding and chooses suitable NHV filtered by VIP and 
VID. It eliminates the probability of packet duplication. Both 
CTRC and D-flooding do not use any connectivity assurance 
methodology, therefore network load is very heavy initially. In 
particular, for CMGV, network load is in the range of 45-5, 
whereas it is 50-10, 100-70 and 100-90 in case of CAG, CTRC 
and D-Flooding, respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 9: Hop Count (N) vs. Number of CA, CU and 
SV (NV) in presence of 20 malicious vehicles 
Fig. 9 shows the variation in hop count with different values 
of number of vehicles(NV). It clearly shows that enhancement 
in hop count is proportional to the number of vehicles. CMGV 
selects appropriate next hop vehicle using VIP and VID 
techniques, which reduces the hop count. CAG also shows less 
hop counts as it uses CAA algorithm integrated with most 
forwarding within radius (MFR). Though CTRC uses MFR 
techniques, it has no CAA mechanism, which enhances the one 
time transmission failure rate and results into more hop count. 
D-Flooding incorporates all vehicular nodes within the 
transmission range as suitable next hop vehicle, which results 
into the highest hop count. In particular, for CMGV, hop count 
is in the range of 2-41, whereas it is 10-50, 30-100 and 60-400 
in case of CAG, CTRC and D-Flooding, respectively. 
The results in Fig. 10 show the analysis of end-to-end delay 
as a function of number of vehicles(NV). It clearly shows that 
the end-to-end delay reduces as number of vehicles increases. 
More specifically, for CMGV, end-to-end delay is in the range 
of 22-3, whereas it is 24-5, 33-25 and 36-21 in case of CAG, 
CTRC and D-Flooding respectively. CMGV minimizes the 
probability of one-hop connection failure as it uses a reliable 
path with the highest connectivity probability. The connectivity 
probability is high due to the selection of most trusted next hop 
vehicle filtered by VIP and VID phases. CTRC faces the 
problem of speed variation (when the intended next hop vehicle 
moves out of the transmission range of current forwarder) and 
increases the rate of one hop transmission failure. This results 
high end-to-end delay. D-flooding uses flooding technique, 
which increases the number of collisions.  
 
 
Fig. 10. End-to-End Delay (s) vs. Number of CA, CU and SV 
(NV) in presence of 20 malicious vehicles 
 
Fig. 11: Packet Duplication (N) vs Number of CA, CU 
and SV (NV) in presence of 20 malicious vehicles 
 
Fig. 11 shows variation in the packet duplication with the 
different values of number of vehicles(NV). It clearly shows 
that the packet duplication is proportional to the number of 
vehicles. CMGV shows very low packet duplication rate as it 
prohibits the formation of duplicate packets by optimizing the 
selection of NHV. The malicious attacker is unable to 
masquerade the secured network and unable to form duplicate 
packets due to screening by VIP and VID phases. More 
specifically, for CMGV, packet duplication is in the range of 
50-200, whereas it is 50-260, 80-500 and 100-4700 in case of 
CAG, CTRC and D-Flooding, respectively. The packet 
duplication rate in case of CAG is low due to its unique CA 
selection approach. CTRC has higher retransmission rate, 
which results into higher packet duplication rate. D-Flooding 
has the highest packet duplication rate as it totally depends on 
duplicate packets, generated due to flooding for its data 
delivery.  
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have proposed a framework of 
cybersecurity measures for geocasting in vehicular cyber 
physical environment (CMGV). We determine the probability 
of connectivity of vehicular nodes for V2V and V2I 
communicational patterns. Connectivity oriented security 
measures: VIP and VID are developed to protect and defend the 
 
 
connected vehicles. The simulation results validate that CMGV 
outperforms state of the art geocasting approaches in presence 
of malicious vehicles. The probability of connectivity rapidly 
increases for CMGV in commensurate with the increase of 
number of vehicular nodes, transmission range and types of 
vehicle. The packet delivery ratio, packet duplication, and hop 
count of CMGV increase, whereas packet loss rate, end-to-end 
delay and network load decrease in commensurate with the 
increase of number of vehicular nodes. In future research, 
authors will analyze the impact of traffic signal on connectivity 
by securing the traffic system and will investigate the security 
aspects by incorporating traffic load with the quality model and 
integrate our proposed concept with multilane highways. 
APPENDIX-I 
At first, the node 𝑋1 sets Yii = 0. Then, it calculates Yij as 
follows. 
 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑦𝑖 + 𝑦𝑗 
           𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑙𝑛(𝛽𝑖
𝑥𝑖𝛽𝑗
𝑥𝑗)                                                                                                                 
 In this manner, all possible values of Yij are calculated. It is 
seen that Yij = Yji . The calculated values of Yij are given in 
Table III. The node 𝑋1 calculates α1 as follows. 









𝑥3)                                                                                                                   
In this manner, the node 𝑋1 calculates different possible values 
of αi as shown in Table IV. 
 
TABLE I: calculation of 𝑌𝑖𝑗 





























TABLE II : Calculation of 𝛼𝑖 
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